On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, held a videotaped tea-dance party in
their atrium lobby. With many party-goers standing and dancing on the
suspended walkways, connections supporting the ceiling rods that held up
the second- and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium failed, and
both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium below. (The
fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway, while the
offset third-floor walkway remained intact.)
As the United States' most
devastating structural failure in terms of loss of life and injuries,
the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in
excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs
resulted from the collapse, and thousands of lives were adversely
affected.
two vertically walkways collapsed at the Hyatt Regency in Kansas City,
falling into the hotel’s lobby. 114 people were killed at what was then
the deadliest structure collapse in the history of the United States.
Serious flaws were found in the design of the walkways. The engineers
who had approved the final drawings of the walkways were convicted of
gross negligence and misconduct and lost their engineering licenses
On February 16,
1979, G.C.E. received 42 shop drawings (including the revised Shop
Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E-3). On February 26, 1979, G.C.E.
returned the drawings to Havens, stamped with Gillum's engineering
review seal, authorizing construction. The fabricator (Havens) built the
walkways in compliance with the directions contained in the structural
drawings, as interpreted by the shop drawings, with regard to these
hangers. In addition, Havens followed the American Institute of Steel
Construction (AISC) guidelines and standards for the actual design of
steel-to- steel connections by steel fabricators.
On October 14, 1979, part of
the atrium roof collapsed while the hotel was under construction. As a
result, the owner called in the inspection team. The inspection team's
contract dealt primarily with the investigation of the cause of the roof
collapse and created no obligation to check any engineering or design
work beyond the scope of their investigation and contract
Due to evidence supplied at the
Hearings, a number of principals involved lost their engineering
licenses, a number of firms went bankrupt, and many expensive legal
suits were settled out of court. In November, 1984, Duncan, Gillum, and
G.C.E. International, Inc. were found guilty of gross negligence,
misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering.
Subsequently, Duncan and Gillum lost their licenses to practice
engineering in the State of Missouri (and later, Texas), and G.C.E. had
its certificate of authority as an engineering firm revoked.
As a
result of the Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, the American Society of
Civil Engineering (ASCE) adopted a report that states structural
engineers have full responsibility for design projects.
Both Duncan and Gillum are now practicing engineers in states other than Missouri and Texas.
The
responsibility for and obligation to design steel-to-steel connections
in construction lies at the heart of the Hyatt Regency Hotel project
controversy. To understand the issues of negligence and the engineer's
design responsibility, we must examine some key elements associated with
professional obligations to protect the public. This will be discussed
in class from three perspectives: the implicit social contract between
engineers and society; the issue of public risk and informed consent;
and negligence and codes of ethics of professional societies.
No comments:
Post a Comment